THE OFFICIAL CHINESE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BURLINGAME MISSION

The first Chinese diplomatic mission to Europe and the United States, generally known as the Burlingame Mission, represented the earliest voluntary move on the part of the Chinese government to deal with Western nations in accord with practices generally accepted in the West. During the first half of the nineteenth century all efforts made by the representatives of Western countries to establish satisfactory diplomatic relations with the Chinese government were frustrated, the traditional Chinese conception of the absolute superiority of their civilization and the primacy of their emperor making intercourse on an equal basis impossible. The so-called Opium War was to a very large extent brought on by the friction resulting from the Chinese attitude of superiority and contempt toward foreigners. Although the British were victorious and dictated the terms of the Treaty of Nanking which was signed in 1842, they achieved only partial success, for while the treaty stipulated that diplomatic and consular officials should be treated as equals by Chinese provincial officials of corresponding rank, the capital remained closed to the residence of the foreign representatives.

During the early 1850's the foreign diplomats accredited to China, deciding that it was impossible to obtain satisfaction from the ultra-conservative Canton governor general—who alone was empowered to deal with them—determined to go directly to the authorities in Peking. Finding that this could not be peacefully achieved, Great Britain and France resorted to military force with the result that the Chinese government was finally forced to permit the establishment of foreign legations in the capital. To deal with them a foreign office was set up in 1861, although the foreign diplomats were not received personally by the emperor because of their refusal to kowtow in the manner required of all persons coming into his presence.

The Chinese were forced to accept the presence of the legations, but since they were not forced to reciprocate by sending their own diplomatic representatives, they made no effort to do so. When pressed on the subject by individual foreign diplomats, high Chinese dignitaries usually replied that it was the intention of their government eventually to send envoys abroad, but that such a step was too revolutionary to be taken at once. Furthermore, they argued, the Treaty Powers had commercial
and missionary interests in China which required the attention of diplomatic and consular representatives, but China had no such interests abroad to demand the presence of Chinese officials.¹

The ministers of the foreign office, however, were constantly subjected to the arguments of foreigners who believed that China should be represented in foreign capitals. Certain foreign diplomats pushed the matter because they felt that China’s reticence was due to her refusal to accept their countries as her equals. Other foreigners such as Robert Hart, inspector general of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs, Anson Burlingame, American minister to China, and W. A. P. Martin, a teacher in and later head of the T’ung-wên-kuan,⁶ who were influential with the higher officials dealing with foreign affairs, urged the matter because they felt that representation abroad would be of great benefit to China.

Finally, in 1866, at the suggestion of Robert Hart who was returning to England for a short furlough, the ministers of the foreign office asked the emperor for permission to send with him three students of the T’ung-wên-kuan, accompanied by a retired official of low rank, to study conditions in Europe. Permission was granted and the Pin Ch’un⁶ Mission was dispatched.² It had no diplomatic status, but it was well received in the nine European countries visited, and being the first mission of any kind to be sent to Europe in modern times, it established an important precedent.

Toward the middle of November, 1867, Anson Burlingame, who had been the American minister in China since 1862, called at the foreign office to bid Prince Kung⁴ and the other ministers farewell in view of his intention to resign his post and return to the United States.³ After considerable expression of good feeling and regret over his departure, the suggestion was made that he might serve the Chinese, as he had on a previous visit to the West, by doing what he could to explain China’s intentions and to correct misapprehensions. In fact the principal Chinese ministers suggested that he might serve China officially in the capacity of an envoy.⁴ The matter seems to have been brought up at the time

¹ Ch’ou-pan i-wu shih-mo⁸ [The Beginning and End of the Management of Barbarian Affairs], (Peiping, Palace Museum, 1929–1931), T’ung Chih section, L, 32a, 2–4. This work, cited hereafter as IWSM, is a very full official compilation of documents relating to foreign affairs. The small letters refer to the Chinese characters at the end of the article.
² IWSM, XLVI, 17a-18a. The T’ung-wên-kuan was a school established in Peking in 1862 by the foreign office to teach foreign languages and later Western sciences.
³ Burlingame to Secretary of State Seward, Dec. 14, 1867, Papers relating to Foreign Affairs, 1868 (Washington, 1869), I, 494. This series is cited hereafter as For. Rel.
rather incidentally, but in view of the rapidity with which the Chinese reached a decision, it is quite evident that they had had something of the kind under consideration for some time.  

Even though the suggestion that Burlingame be sent abroad as a Chinese envoy may have been made lightly, it soon became the subject of very serious consideration. The members of the foreign office report that they visited the American legation several times on the excuse of paying farewell visits and that each time the matter was discussed. And although Burlingame states that he had no further conversations with the Chinese until they made him a formal offer, we know that in the interim he gave considerable thought to the matter and after discussing it with his friends, "determined, in the interests of our country and civilization, to accept". The ministers of the foreign office formally offered Burlingame the post on November 18, and he accepted. On the 21st the following imperial rescript was handed down:

The foreign office has memorialized to the effect that the minister, Anson Burlingame, is even-tempered in dealing with matters and is conversant with the general conditions of China and foreign countries. He is therefore appointed to go to the Treaty Powers as Minister for the Management of Chinese Diplomatic Relations with the Powers. The other matters are to be carried out as recommended.

In the same rescript in which Burlingame was appointed, another foreign office memorial was approved in which it was suggested that J. McLeavy Brown, acting Chinese secretary of the British legation, and E. de Champs, a Frenchman belonging to the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs service, together with one or two Chinese officials, be appointed to accompany him. The memorial expresses a fear that England and France might be suspicious of the appointment of Burlingame as China's

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5 Hart informs us that he had discussed the matter of sending representatives abroad every time he had visited the foreign office during September and October, 1867, and that he had even been told by one of the ministers that they were considering appointing him to accompany whichever Chinese official should be chosen to go. Robert Hart, "Note on Chinese Matters", in Frederick Wells Williams, Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese Mission to Foreign Powers (New York, 1912), pp. 285–286.

6 "We unfortunately have no men [i.e., natives] to send abroad as envoys and since Burlingame desires to establish a reputation, and has resolutely volunteered for the responsibility, and since he is really sincere at heart, we have gone to his legation on successive days on the excuse of paying farewell visits to talk with him about this matter. [On those occasions] his words have been most noble and public-spirited." IWSM, LI, 27b, 3–5.

7 For. Rel., 1868, I, 494. Martin (p. 375), who was very intimate with Burlingame, writes that the latter was much pleased by the possibilities which he could see in such a position; he felt that while it might delay, it might also help his political career.

8 IWSM, LI, 28a, 4–5; 29a, 6–7.
diplomatic representative and states that attaching nationals of those countries to the mission should make them more willing to receive it. Brown's views are, in general, in accord with those of Burlingame, and De Champs has proved his dependability while accompanying the Pin Ch'Un Mission; besides, both men are able to use the Chinese language. It was also thought that there should be one or two undersecretaries of the foreign office attached to the mission to take charge of correspondence with that office and with whom Burlingame should consult concerning measures to be taken.9

On November 26 a rescript was handed down accepting a recommendation of the foreign office that Brown and De Champs be attached to the mission as First and Second secretaries respectively.8 Brown had complained that without Chinese official rank he and De Champs would lack the prestige necessary to their function, so the foreign office compromised between its fear that too much power would make them dangerous and too little honor make them resentful by suggesting that they be given high-sounding titles but no official rank. On the same day another rescript 10 appointed Chih Kang9 and Sun Chia-ku,1 two undersecretaries of the foreign office, Ministers for the Management of Chinese Diplomatic Relations1—a title identical in meaning with that given Burlingame.

Two general reasons were given by the foreign office for the sending of this mission: namely, (1) that misunderstandings had resulted from the fact that foreign governments were in possession of full information concerning China, whereas the Chinese were abysmally ignorant of conditions in foreign countries, and (2) that China had no means of checking the improper actions of foreign ministers stationed in Peking since she did not have access to their superiors.11

A more special reason given for appointing Burlingame as China's representative to the Treaty Powers 12 at this time was that he might explain away the confusion existing in the West regarding China's actions and intentions. The foreign office felt that there were no Chinese

9 Ibid., 28b, 4–29a, 1.
10 Ibid., LII, 2a, 6–2b, 1; 5a, 10–6a, 1.
11 Ibid., LI, 27a, 3–6.
12 Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (Shanghai, 1918), II, 188, says that Burlingame was "accrued to all the courts of the world", but this is not true. Furthermore, in the archives of the American legation in Peking we find the translation of a letter addressed by the Chinese foreign office to S. W. Williams, the American chargé d'affaires, dated Aug. 28, 1868, in which it is stated that the mission is to confine itself to the countries having treaty relations with China because, since it would be impossible to visit all non-treaty powers, if some were visited the others might resent being neglected. U. S. Legation Archives, China, no. 230, f. 515.
who were competent to do this, and it considered Burlingame honest and well intentioned. It pointed out that European countries had occasionally sent men who were not their own nationals as envoys, basing their choice upon trustworthiness rather than place of origin, and even China had found the services of Hart, an Englishman, in its Maritime Customs, entirely satisfactory. So it urged that China would undoubtedly profit more by sending Burlingame as its representative than it would by sending only Chinese.\textsuperscript{13}

The impending revision of treaties was also a factor—possibly the most important one—in the sending of the Burlingame Mission, as was suggested by Williams at the time and also hinted at in the first foreign office memorial.\textsuperscript{14} The Chinese were fearful that "progress", particularly in the form of concessions to foreigners, would be demanded of them, and that if these demands were not granted the powers would again resort to force. It was hoped that Burlingame would be able to persuade the governments to which the mission was accredited that China was progressing as rapidly as could be expected and that forbearance and patience on their parts were necessary.\textsuperscript{15}

Anson Burlingame, while serving as American minister, had won the confidence and respect of the Chinese by his friendly and sympathetic attitude toward their government which was passing through a difficult period of readjustment to the new conditions arising out of the Anglo-French war of 1860 and the forced opening of the capital to the residence of foreign diplomatic representatives. The members of the foreign office, in recommending his appointment, spoke of his even temper and of his understanding of conditions both in China and abroad, and they recalled that he had supported them in the unfortunate matter of the Lay-Osborne Flotilla, and had exerted himself in an unofficial capacity to explain the Chinese position while on a previous visit to the West.\textsuperscript{16} With his courtly and diplomatic manner, his honesty and breadth of vision, and his ability as an orator, he was the ideal man to send on such a mission as this.

Chih Kang, a Manchu, and Sun Chia-ku, a Chinese, had been employed as undersecretaries in the foreign office for several years, and were well acquainted with China's foreign relations. At the time of their appointment to accompany Burlingame, Chih Kang wore the

\textsuperscript{13} IWSM, LI, 27b, 5–9.

\textsuperscript{14} For. Rel., 1868, 1, 496; IWSM, LI, 27b, 9–10.

\textsuperscript{15} For. Rel., 1868, 1, 495–496; Hart, "Note", op. cit., p. 287; Martin, p. 376.

\textsuperscript{16} For Burlingame's part in the settlement of this difficulty, see Martin, pp. 231–232; IWSM, LI, 27a, 7–10. For Burlingame's farewell interviews with members of the foreign office before going home on his first furlough, in 1865, see For. Rel., 1865, II, 445–449.
decoration of the peacock feather and held the official position of an intendant of the Maritime Customs awaiting assignment to a post, and Sun held an honorary position as intendant of circuit and actual positions of prefect awaiting assignment to a major post and senior secretary of the Board of Rites. With their new appointment as envoys, both Chih Kang and Sun were elevated to the second official rank and Sun was given a peacock feather.  

In addition to Brown and De Champs, six students of the T'ung-wên-kuan were ordered to accompany the mission in the capacity of interpreters. They were Tê Ming (Chang Tê-i) and Feng I, students in the English department who had accompanied Pin Ch'un to Europe, T'a Kê Shih No and Kuei Jung, students in the Russian department, and Lien Fang and T'ing Chûn of the French department. Four copyists of low official rank were also ordered to accompany the mission as were two minor military officers who were to act as orderlies. All of the Chinese attachés were elevated in rank in order to increase their prestige, and also, probably, to compensate them for having to spend some time away from China. A number of attendants and servants must have been added to the group, for Burlingame wrote to Secretary of State Seward before leaving China that his suite numbered about thirty persons.

In examining the instructions and credentials of the mission, great care is necessary because of disagreements in the source materials. Professor F. W. Williams, whose book is considered the standard work on the Burlingame Mission, believed that no written instructions had been given Burlingame and that the foreign office note of December 7 to S. W. Williams and the other foreign representatives stationed in Peking "claims attention as the sole authorisation for action abroad vouchsafed by the Imperial Government to its Embassy". While the authenticity of this note from the Chinese foreign office cannot be doubted, there is no copy of it in the Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo whereas there is in that compilation a set of written instructions to Burlingame which are very

\[\underline{17}\] S. W. Williams to Seward, For. Rel., 1868, I, 495. The peacock feather was the principal form of decoration for public service during the Ch'ing dynasty.

\[\underline{18}\] IWSM, LII, 1a, 3–5; 2a, 9–10.

\[\underline{19}\] Ibid., 6a–6b; For. Rel., 1868, I, 494.

\[\underline{20}\] Williams, pp. 103–104. This document occurs in two translations in For. Rel., 1868, I. The first is that sent to the Department of State by S. W. Williams (pp. 499–500), and the second, made by Brown, was filed with the Department of State by the mission after its arrival in Washington (pp. 602–603). Although there are numerous superficial differences and a few important ones, these translations were obviously made from the same original; in Johannes von Gumpach, The Burlingame Mission (Shanghai, 1872), pp. 163–164, the original note (in Chinese) sent to the British minister is reproduced.
specific and which seem to have been entirely unknown to foreigners outside the mission and perhaps even to Burlingame himself.\textsuperscript{21} Neither are there in the \textit{Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo} copies of the letters of credence, but there is a memorial from the foreign office requesting such letters, and a later memorial quoting a statement from the envoys to the effect that they had received the letters, so there seems to be no doubt that the emperor really issued the letters which were presented in the different capitals visited by the mission.\textsuperscript{22}

The instructions given Burlingame by the foreign office, in which his powers and limitations are defined, were presented for “imperial inspection” on November 26, 1867. They point out, in the first place, that only those diplomatic dealings which will result in benefits both to China and to the country being dealt with are to be permitted, but that neither country shall resort to coercion in securing them. The foreign office has for a long time desired to have Chinese officials sent to the powers, but the lack of experienced men has made it impossible; now the Chinese government is sending Burlingame to the powers to manage matters just as if he were a Chinese official. It is necessary, however, to send Chinese officials with him in order that he may consult with them and that they may gain experience. These men being “imperially appointed officials” are, therefore, according to Chinese precedent, of equal rank with Burlingame and with any of the ministers of the powers with whom they may have dealings.\textsuperscript{23} Furthermore all matters concerning

\textsuperscript{21} It must be remembered that Burlingame knew no Chinese and that none of the responsible Chinese knew English; consequently he was entirely at the mercy of his non-Chinese interpreters. It seems impossible to say whether Burlingame knew of these instructions—which he certainly did not follow in any case; or whether Brown and perhaps Hart knew of their existence and kept him in ignorance; or whether the foreign office merely wrote them for the benefit of the conservatives about the Throne and then kept them to itself, or, even if it made them known to the members of the mission, orally informed them that they need not be followed.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{IWSM}, LIV, 29b–31a; LVII, 35b, 3–6. Von Gumpach reproduces in his book (pp. 62–64) the Chinese and Manchu texts of the letter of credence addressed to the queen of England. A comparison of his Chinese text with the official translation (which is to be found in \textit{For. Rel., 1868}, I, 601–602) leads one to the conclusion that Von Gumpach reproduces a true copy.

\textsuperscript{23} In its note of Dec. 7, already referred to, the foreign office expresses a fear that the foreign ministers stationed in Peking will consider the “imperial appointment” of three men to mean that no one of them is to take the lead in dealing with the powers. This is not to be the case, however, for when the envoys reach a country where there are matters to be dealt with, conversations are to be carried on by Burlingame alone, for the Chinese government, and when a method of handling matters has been decided upon by Burlingame, Chih Kang and Sun Chia-ku shall notify the foreign office after consulting with him. Von Gumpach (Chinese text), pp. 163, 7–9; 164, upper half, 13–16. This statement seems to conflict with the terms of the first part of Burlingame’s instructions, and so far as the writer can see there is no explanation of the disagreement. The difference is.
the mission are to be discussed by Burlingame with his two co-envoys, in order that they may transmit the information to the foreign office for its approval.

After citing as a precedent Article III of the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of Tientsin,\textsuperscript{24} which provides that the British diplomatic representative in China shall not be called upon to perform any ceremony derogatory to the dignity of his country, the foreign office instructs Burlingame to avoid, if possible, the customary audience granted to newly arrived diplomatic representatives in the West. If it cannot be avoided, he is told to make known his instructions on this point and to make arrangements whereby there shall be no formal ceremonies until some later date when articles of ceremony have been mutually agreed upon by China and the various powers. Article IV of the same treaty, guaranteeing diplomatic inviolability and the same treatment of diplomatic representatives as is accorded officers of the same rank by the laws of other countries, is also cited as a precedent for the mission, and Burlingame is requested to take charge of all matters pertaining to the transportation and residence of the party. He is informed that all expenses are to be met from Chinese funds.

Ordinary matters which are beneficial and not injurious are to be handled by Burlingame and his two colleagues, subject to the confirmation of the foreign office. In matters of great importance, however, the envoys are merely to draw up the particulars and inform the foreign office, leaving the decision to that body.\textsuperscript{25} Official wooden seals are to be given Burlingame and his two co-envoys, but their use is to be limited to correspondence, for only the foreign office seal can give validity to acts or agreements. It is pointed out that the dispatch of this mission is an experiment and is quite different from the sending of permanent diplomatic representatives. The mission is to stay abroad only one year, but the foreign office promises that if on its return it is found that satis-

\textsuperscript{24} The full Chinese and English texts of this treaty are to be found in Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States (2d ed., Shanghai, 1917), I, 404-420.

\textsuperscript{25} Determining the difference between "beneficial and non-injurious matters" and "very important matters" would seem to be no simple task. It may be, of course, that this rather indefinite distinction was made intentionally in order to give the envoys more freedom of action than would appear from a casual perusal of their instructions.

\textsuperscript{25} Some emphasis in Brown's translation in which he interpolates into the text a phrase which cannot be found either in the Chinese original or in Williams's translation: "His Majesty in this appointment charged Mr. Burlingame, assisted by his secretaries, with the exclusive control and responsibility of the business of the Mission." For. Rel., 1868, I, 602. Certainly Burlingame does not give a true impression of the position of his two co-envoys when he writes to Secretary Seward that they are "two Chinese gentlemen of the highest rank [who] were selected from the foreign office to conduct the Chinese correspondence, and as 'learners'." Ibid., p. 494.
factory results have been obtained, the matter of sending permanent missions will be brought up for discussion. The instructions insist, finally, that, under the terms of the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of Tientsin, the students, secretaries, and orderlies accompanying the mission, shall receive proper protection in each of the countries visited. 26

When the question of providing the envoys with letters of credence was raised, two difficulties presented themselves. In the first place, many of the high officials in the government felt that the sending of a letter from the emperor directly to the heads of government of the Western powers would be a violation of the traditional supremacy of the Son of Heaven. 27 They had been quite willing to have the emperor approve the sending of the mission, which they seem to have looked upon as another foreign office experiment not unlike the Pin Ch'un venture of the preceding year, but giving it personal letters of recommendation from the emperor was another matter.

Fortunately Hart and Brown were able to meet this difficulty by pointing out through the foreign office that the emperor had on two previous occasions written letters in answer to communications from the President of the United States, and “that if his Majesty could personally reply to a letter from the President of the United States without derogating from his authority and dignity, he certainly could write a letter to him with equal propriety”. 28 The foreign office, in its memorial of December 24 formally requesting letters of credence, quotes Brown to the effect that it is customary in other countries to give diplomatic representatives credentials in order to give assurance of their reliability, and cites as a precedent from China’s own history the fact that credentials were carried by Chinese envoys in ancient times. 29

The other difficulty arose out of the Western custom of having diplomatic representatives personally present their letters of credence to the rulers to whom they were addressed. The audience question had been a vexing one from the time of the arrival of the first foreign ministers in Peking, for the foreign representatives had demanded the right to present their credentials to the emperor in person, as was the custom in Western countries, whereas the Chinese were willing to accede to this

26 IWSM, LII, 2b–5a.
27 It should be pointed out, however, that the foreign office, in its memorial of Nov. 26 recommending the appointment of Chih Kang and Sun Chia-ku to accompany Burlington, informs the emperor that this mission is of a very different nature from the one sent to the Loochoo kingdom, which is looked upon as a tributary by the Chinese. Ibid., 1b, 10–2a, 1.
28 S. W. Williams to Seward, For. Rel., 1868, I, 503.
29 IWSM, LIV, 29b, 9.
demand only on the understanding that the foreigners would perform the kowtow. The foreign ministers refused to perform this ceremony on the ground that it reflected upon the dignity of their countries and themselves, and a compromise had been worked out by eliminating the imperial audience during the minority of the emperor. Now, however, the Chinese apparently feared that in presenting letters of credence to the heads of the various governments to which they were sent, Burlingame and his associates would establish a precedent as to the ceremony followed which might prove to be embarrassing should the foreign ministers demand that it be followed in Peking.

The foreign office solved this second difficulty by another compromise. In its memorial of December 20, mentioned above, it says that in order to avoid the suspicion of the powers it is necessary to provide the mission with letters of credence, but that it does not seem necessary to have these letters presented personally to the various heads of government. It points out that on certain occasions in the past the British and Belgian ministers have forwarded their credentials through high provincial officials or through the foreign office, although since the establishment of legations in Peking most of the foreign ministers have not presented credentials or have merely sent copies of their letters of credence to the foreign office. It is considered possible, therefore, for the envoys to follow the British and Belgian precedent and have the chief minister of each government present their letter of credence to the ruler for them. Burlingame is to be instructed to follow this procedure and also to notify each government that the same procedure is to be followed thereafter by its representative in Peking.\footnote{Ibid., 30a, 4–30b, 8.}

In a communication to Burlingame at the same time, the foreign office informs him that on two occasions American ministers have forwarded their credentials to the emperor through high Chinese officials and because of the difference between Chinese and foreign ceremonial he is instructed to follow that precedent in presenting his letters of credence in America and in other countries. He is further told that should he find it impossible to refuse to follow Western etiquette in this matter, he must explain at the time that he is following Western ceremony and that it is different from Chinese ceremony.\footnote{Ibid., 31a–32a. That the foreign office wrote this letter for Burlingame’s information, and not merely to mislead the Chinese court, is substantiated by the following translation of a letter which Cordier says was sent by the foreign office to the French chargé d’affaires in Peking on Sept. 19, 1869, in reply to a request from the foreign ministers for an imperial audience: “Avant le départ de M. Burlingame, nous demandâmes respectueusement (à l’Empereur) des instructions que nous reçu mes (ainsi conçues):}
communication Burlingame is instructed to avoid all things forbidden in China, and to follow Chinese customs and regulations. If, however, because he is a Westerner, the powers deal with him according to Western customs, he must make known the Chinese custom, in order that the powers shall have no chance in the future to claim that China does not reciprocate their courtesies. 32

The letters of credence, all of which are the same except for the name of the country whose ruler was being addressed, begin with a few formal words of greeting which are followed by an expressed desire that the friendly relations existing between China and the named state may be perpetuated. The appointment of Anson Burlingame, Chih Kang, and Sun Chia-ku as Chinese envoys is announced and full confidence is expressed in their character and ability. The letters close with the statement that the emperor would be deeply gratified by the establishment of permanent peace and harmony among all nations. 33 The letters of credence, eleven in number, were written in Chinese and Manchu on imperial yellow paper, and were dispatched in the care of Brown, who joined the other members of the mission in Shanghai. 34

Although there is no evidence in the available Chinese documents to show that there was organized opposition to the sending of this mission, we know from Williams's letter of January 25 that there was strong opposition to the granting of credentials and that had it not been for the ingenious arguments of Brown and Hart there probably would have been no letters of credence. It seems safe to say, however, after an examination of the answers to a "secret letter" which had been sent by the foreign office to the higher provincial officials of the empire on October 12 requesting an expression of opinion on certain questions, among

"Lors de l'arrivée de M. Burlingame dans un pays, les lettres de créance dont il est porteur devront être confiées à l'intermédiaire des Ministres compétents sans qu'il soit besoin de se mettre en instance pour les remettre en mains propres.

"Si un pays (un souverain) considérant M. Burlingame comme occidental désire le traiter conformément aux coutumes d'Occident avec de plus grands égards, M. Burlingame devra déclarer préalablement, afin qu'il ne soit pas supposé dans la suite que la Chine ne sait pas reconnaître de tels procédés, que le céramonial chinois n'est pas le même que celui d'Occident." Henri Cordier, Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales, 1860–1900 (Paris, 1901), I, 301. While the writer has not found such a letter in the Chinese documents under the date given by Cordier, he has found one very like this French translation, written by the Chinese foreign office in answer to a joint request for an audience, dated Mar. 21, 1873. IWSM, LXXXIX, 37b, 6–38a, 6.

32 Ibid., LIV, 32a–32b.
33 Von Gumpach, pp. 62–64. The official English translation is also to be found in that book, pp. 66–67, and in For. Rel., 1868, I, 601–602. The letters were dated Dec. 31, 1867.
34 S. W. Williams to Seward, ibid., p. 502.
them that of sending envoys abroad,\textsuperscript{35} that few of the higher provincial officials would have opposed this mission; in fact, several who knew of the plan to send it before they wrote their answers definitely expressed their approval.\textsuperscript{36} And we know of none of the higher metropolitan officials who definitely opposed it.\textsuperscript{37}

Burlingame left Peking on November 25, 1867,\textsuperscript{38} proceeding to Shanghai by steamer from Tientsin. While awaiting the arrival of the other members of the mission, he is reported to have paid a visit to Tsêng Kuo-fan,\textsuperscript{7} governor general of the two Kiang provinces and one of the senior statesmen of the empire, in Nanking. Tsêng seems to have been no more than civil to Burlingame,\textsuperscript{39} to the disappointment of certain foreigners who felt that a declaration from this man in support of the mission would greatly have added to its prestige.

On January 4, 1868, Chih Kang and Sun Chia-ku were received at an imperial audience. In answer to a question concerning their contemplated itinerary, they informed the empresses dowager and the emperor that they were leaving the capital the next day and after an overland trip to Shanghai they would sail to the United States via Japan.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., pp. 502–503; IWSM, L, 32a, 32b.

\textsuperscript{36} Ting Pao-chên,\textsuperscript{7} ibid., LII, 26b; Li Hung-chang,\textsuperscript{8} ibid., LV, 12a; and Kuan Wen,\textsuperscript{4} who, although he opposed permanent missions, had no objection to this one, ibid., LVI, 11b.

\textsuperscript{37} There is evidence to indicate that the memorial which is adduced as proof of opposition by Professor Williams in his study of this mission is a forgery. From an unsigned article entitled “Chinese Statesmen and State Papers” (which he attributes to Sir Rutherford Alcock), in Fraser’s Magazine, N. S., III (1871), 340 ff., but which he incorrectly cites as from the Fortnightly Review, I, Professor Williams summarizes a memorial allegedly written by Wo Jen,\textsuperscript{u} a high metropolitan official and tutor to the young emperor. This memorial, which is very critical of the mission, does not appear in any of the Chinese documents examined and an examination of the evidence indicates that it is not genuine. In the first place, it is extremely unlikely that the emperor would issue more than one edict in making any one appointment and since in the official documents are to be found a decree, dated Nov. 21, appointing Burlingame, and another decree, dated Nov. 26, appointing the other two envoys, the genuineness of such a decree as is quoted in the memorial, making all the appointments and dated the 26th day of the 10th moon (Nov. 21, 1867), is to be questioned. In the second place, there would be no point to the argument concerning the subordinate positions of the Chinese envoys in the memorial, because Chih Kang and Sun Chia-ku were not made “sub-envoys”. As we have already seen, they held the same office as Burlingame. Professor Williams (p. 106) fails to produce any valid “evidences of dissatisfaction over the conception of an Embassy to the Western powers” which he says were “numerous and immediate on the part of the conservative politicians in Peking”. For a summary of the alleged Wo Jen memorial, see ibid., pp. 108–109.

\textsuperscript{38} S. W. Williams to Seward, For. Rel., 1868, I. 495.

\textsuperscript{39} Williams, p. 89. Unfortunately Professor Williams does not cite his source for this information.
From there they would cross the Atlantic to England, and then travel to France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, Prussia, Spain, and Italy, returning to China via the Mediterranean and South Seas. When asked a question concerning audiences with foreign rulers, they replied that that matter depended upon the rulers—that they themselves would not request such interviews. In reply to an admonition, they promised to see that their attendants behaved themselves, thus avoiding disgrace to themselves and to their country. They left Peking, as they had said, on the 5th and arrived in Shanghai on February 3.

The mission sailed from Shanghai on February 25 and after a short unofficial stop in Yokohama, sailed from Japan on March 8. San Francisco was reached on April 1 and the members of the mission spent nearly a month in that city, occupying their time with social activities, visits to shipyards, machine shops, factories, etc., and with interviews with the representatives of the Chinese merchants and laborers living in California. The party sailed from San Francisco for Panama on April 30 and after proceeding across the Isthmus by rail, took ship again and reached New York on May 23.

After a ten-day stay in New York, the mission proceeded to Washington, where the envoys promptly called at the Department of State and in a formal note to Secretary Seward, in which Burlingame attributed to himself rank and position to which he had no right, requested that a day be set for the presentation of their letters of credence; June 6 was decided upon as a suitable date for this ceremony. It is difficult to reconcile this request with Burlingame’s instructions and with the statement made by the Chinese envoys during their audience the day before they left Peking, but it is even more difficult to see any basis for the claims made by Burlingame. Not only did he not hold “the first Chinese rank”, as he announced in this note and repeated in his speech to the President on the 6th, but he had never been given any Chinese rank; and the superiority over his two co-envoys which is implied in both is quite unjustifiable since, as we have already seen, they held exactly the same position as he. In granting the request for an interview with the President, Secretary Seward reserved the right of an

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40 This point should be kept in mind when the correspondence between the mission and the American Department of State is examined a little later, for in Washington a formal request was made for an interview with the President of the United States.

41 I Hou, Ch’u-shih T’ai-hai chi [Diary of the First Envoys to the West], in Wang Hsi-ch’i, Hsiao fang-hu-chai yit-ti t’ung-ch’ao. 8 (1891), Xth Book, 102a, 6–15. This work is hereafter referred to as Chih Kang’s Diary. WSM, LVII, 21a, 3; LVII, 35a, 8–9.

42 Ibid., LXIX, 16a, 4–9. Chih Kang’s Diary, 103b, 17–104b, 18; 105a–107b; 107b, 3; 108a, 8.
audience with the emperor for the American representative in Peking, and although this right was to be waived during the minority of the emperor, it would seem that accepting this condition without protest constituted another violation of Burlingame's instructions. At any rate the three envoys were received by President Johnson on the appointed day with the same ceremony as when any other newly arrived diplomatic representative was received.\(^{43}\)

After the members of the mission had spent nearly a month attending dinners and receptions and visiting Congress and places of interest, Burlingame opened conversations with the Department of State in the course of which various matters relating to Chinese foreign relations were discussed. As a result of these discussions eight supplementary articles to the Sino-American Treaty of Tientsin were signed on July 28\(^ {44}\) by Secretary of State Seward and the three representatives of the emperor of China. These negotiations would seem to have violated Burlingame's instructions, since he had been told not to initiate any but routine negotiations without specific permission from the Chinese foreign office, although as we have already pointed out, the wording of his instructions was rather indefinite in this connection and may have been left so intentionally in order to allow the envoys considerable freedom.\(^ {45}\) But there seems to be no justification for the unauthorized seniority which Burlingame claimed over his co-envoys and which is perpetuated in the preamble of the English text of this so-called Treaty of Washington.\(^ {46}\)

On July 31, 1868, the mission left Washington for New York, and on September 9, after visiting Boston, Albany, and other cities, sailed for

\(^{43}\)Ibid., 108b, 3, 11–17.  IWSM, LXIX, 16b, 6–9; 16b, 9–17a. 3.  For. Rel., 1868, I, 601, 603–604.

\(^{44}\)IWSM, LXIX, 17b, 2–5.

\(^{45}\)However, it must be pointed out that the envoys had no “full powers” in the European sense of the term; in spite of the statement in the preamble of the English text of the treaty that the negotiators had “exchanged their full powers, found to be in due and proper form”, they had no instructions to negotiate or sign treaties.  William Frederick Mayers, Treaties between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers (5th ed., Shanghai, 1906), p. 93.

\(^{46}\)“...and His Majesty the Emperor of China, Anson Burlingame, accredited as his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, and Chih Kang, and Sun Chia-ku, of the second Chinese rank, associated high Envoys and Ministers of his said Majesty...”, ibid.  This same discrimination between the envoys is found in the Chinese text reproduced in Treaties, Conventions, etc., I, 729, 11–13, in which Burlingame's name is given the center position, as is proper since he really led the mission, but in which he alone is given the title “Imperially Appointed”, which belonged to all of them, and the additional title of “Minister Holding a Serious Trust”\(^ {8}\) to which he had no special right. The Chinese text which appears in IWSM, LXIX, 18b–21b and in Chih Kang's Diary, 109b, 3–110a, 14, has no preamble.
Europe, arriving in London on September 19. The time spent in England was largely devoted to being entertained and to seeing places of interest, but Burlingame also succeeded in securing the declaration of a new British policy toward China from Lord Clarendon, minister for foreign affairs in the new Liberal Gladstone government. The British government virtually abandoned its policy of resorting to force in securing commercial advantages in China and also repudiated its custom of bringing pressure to bear locally to secure the fulfillment of treaty obligations. It promised to replace these with a policy of patience with regard to the development of China's international relations and to appeal only to the central government for redress for wrongs done British subjects or interests. The negotiations which led to this declaration were completely in accord with Burlingame's instructions and represented exactly what the foreign office seems to have had in mind when it dispatched the mission. The envoys had presented their letters of credence to the queen at Windsor on November 20, and they sailed from Dover on January 2, 1869.

On the Continent the mission did not secure as important results as it had been able to obtain in the United States and England, for the French government refused to commit itself in any way, Burlingame died before anything could be accomplished in Russia, and relations with the other countries visited were of little importance to China. The envoys were received in person by the rulers of all the powers to whom they bore letters of credence, and were feted and shown the principal points of interest in all the countries visited. The mission went directly to Paris from England, and remained there for more than eight months in an effort to secure a statement from the French government, but it did not succeed in accomplishing anything. Leaving Paris on September 21, 1869, the party went to Sweden via Belgium, Prussia, and Denmark, reaching Stockholm on the 27th. Returning to Copenhagen on October 11, the envoys spent two weeks there, and at the end of that time left for Holland, reaching The Hague on October 30. The mission departed for Berlin on November 20, and remained in that city six weeks. In the conversations which took place between Burlingame and Bismarck, the former declared, truthfully, that it was not the desire of the Chinese government to make new treaties, but to obtain from the powers prom-

47 Ibid., 110b, 18–115b, 15.
48 This policy is defined in two documents: one, a letter to Burlingame, dated Dec. 28, 1868, and the other a dispatch to Alcock, British minister to China, dated Jan. 13, 1869. These documents are to be found in Parl. Papers [Command], 1868–1869, vol. LXIV, Accounts and Papers, China, no. 1, pp. 1–2, 5.
49 Chih Kang's Diary, 118a, 5–119a, 17.
ises of forbearance in demanding the execution of the old ones. In reply Bismarck issued a statement to the effect that the North German Confederation was ready to deal with the central government of China in whatever manner the latter considered to be to the best interest of China, a declaration which must have given much satisfaction to those officials who were responsible for having sent the mission. On January 31, 1870, the party left Prussia for Russia, where Burlingame contracted pneumonia and died on February 23.

We have no information concerning the date when the foreign office first learned of the negotiation and signing of the eight supplementary articles to the Treaty of Tientsin, for the letter from the Chinese envoys which contains the description of their activities in Washington is reproduced in the Ch'ou-pan i-wei shih-mo without a date. However, we do find in the archives of the American legation in Peking the translation of a letter on the subject, dated March 12, 1869, from Prince Kung to J. Ross Browne, who succeeded Burlingame as American minister and who had been appointed to exchange the ratifications of the Washington Treaty with the Chinese government. This letter acknowledges the receipt of a letter from Browne requesting the appointment of an official to exchange the ratifications and states in reply that the Chinese government considers it advisable to await the return of the mission in order that the new articles may be discussed with its members before ratification and exchange are effected.

Meanwhile the mission’s success in securing from the American and British governments expressions of sympathy with Chinese self-development and independence of action, and Burlingame’s bursts of oratory in the United States, directed against the predatory tactics of the foreign merchants doing business in China and painting an extremely favorable picture of Chinese “progress”, had stirred up an almost hysterical outburst against the mission in the English language press in the open ports of China. The delay of the Chinese government in ratifying the Washington articles was seized upon as proof of its refusal to ratify and of its failure to support the mission, although the explanation offered

50 Ibid., 119b, 2–128b, 10; Williams, pp. 243, 247.
51 Chih Kang’s Diary, 130b, 7–131a, 17. IWSM, LXXII, 9a, 2–3.
52 Ibid., LXIX, 15b–17b.
53 This document is to be found in U. S. Legation Arch., China, no. 233, ff., 963–965. It is reproduced in Williams, pp. 200–201. Although the original Chinese version has not been found, there seems to be no reason to question its genuineness.
54 See S. W. Williams to Fish, Nov. 24, 1869, Department of State, China, vol. XXVII, no. 69. This letter is quoted in Williams, pp. 228–229, although it is erroneously cited as from “vol. 28".
by the foreign office seems quite reasonable to anyone cognizant of the unfortunate experiences China had had with foreign treaties and foreign military force during the preceding thirty years.

On October 1, 1869, Williams, again American chargé d'affaires after the resignation and departure of Browne, wrote to Secretary of State Fish concerning a recent interview that he had had with the ministers of the foreign office. In the course of the conversation, Wen Hsiang said:

... the government had deemed it best to defer exchanging the ratifications of this treaty until the return of their envoys from Europe, and that this was the purport of the reply made to Mr. Browne last spring when he informed them of his appointment as special commissioner for the purpose. It was yet uncertain what arrangements Mr. Burlingame might make in Europe with the courts which he was to visit, and until they knew this, they deemed it the safest way to defer the completion of this treaty. There was no intention on their part of any disrespect or slight to the United States in so doing, and no intention to decline the stipulations of a treaty which were favourable to them.

The conversation then turned to the criticisms which foreigners had made of the mission and to foreign reports that the emperor had refused to ratify the treaty. These the Chinese ministers considered very unfair, particularly since, "so far as they knew, Mr. Burlingame had done nothing contrary to the purposes of his mission". It is interesting to note that neither at this time nor at any later time did the foreign office indicate that it felt that the mission had exceeded its instructions, even though it is quite obvious that such was the case.

The Washington articles were ratified by the emperor and the ratifications exchanged before the envoys had had time to return and make explanations, however, because Burlingame and his colleagues found their activities in Europe seriously handicapped by the fact that the Chinese government had not yet formally accepted the agreement they had signed in the United States. The outbreak of anti-foreign demonstrations in China shortly after the dispatch of the mission had also tended to undermine confidence in the sincerity of the Chinese government, so Brown, first secretary of the mission, was sent back to Peking personally to urge the foreign office to secure the ratification of the American treaty. In a memorial presented to the Throne on November 18, 1869, and enclosing two letters from Chih Kang and Sun Chia-ku and a copy of the Chinese text of the treaty, the foreign office explains that it had intended to await the return of the treaty in order to discuss the

55 This communication is to be found in Dept. St., China, vol. XXVII, no. 65. It is reproduced in Williams, pp. 224–227.
terms of the new treaty with the envoys before presenting to the Throne those articles which were satisfactory and requesting imperial ratification. But now the envoys have written asking that prompt action be taken, and have even sent Brown to urge it, so, in view of the fact that China's foreign relations have really benefited from the activities of the mission, the emperor is requested to grant the envoys' petition in order that their activities may be facilitated.56

In answer to this memorial an edict was handed down appointing Tung Hsün,6 one of the ministers of the foreign office, to act as the emperor's representative with full power to exchange the ratifications of the eight supplementary articles to the Treaty of Tientsin with the American representative.57 On November 21, S. W. Williams, the American chargé d'affaires, received a communication from Tung Hsün in which it was stated that Brown, who has been sent back to Peking by the envoys for that purpose, has satisfactorily "explained all the circumstances connected with the negotiation of these eight additional articles", and as a consequence the foreign office has given up its former intention to await the return of the mission before asking for ratification. Since all the provisions in the articles "are advantageous to both nations, His Majesty's rescript has already been issued, directing that the affair be speedily arranged in order to show his appreciation of the great friendliness and cordial desire shown by the United States to strengthen our peaceable relations ...".58

November 22 was set as the day on which the exchange was to be effected, but when Williams and Tung Hsün met at the foreign office it was discovered that the copy of the treaty which had been signed by the President of the United States contained only the English text. The exchange was consequently postponed until the next day to allow time for writing in the Chinese text. When the ceremony was over, the foreign office had copies of the treaty made and sent to the important offices in Peking and to the high officials in the coastal provinces.59 There seems to be no valid reason for questioning the good faith of the Chinese government because of the delay in ratifying this treaty. The Chinese were still inexperienced in the methods of Western diplomacy and probably saw no reason why the matter should be hurried. Their desire for fuller information from the members of their mission was but natural, even though the articles seemed to contain nothing

56 IWSM, LXIX, 14a–21b; 14b, 4–15b, 3.
57 Ibid., 15b, 4–6.
58 Ibid., 39b, 5–40a, 7. A translation of this document is to be found in Dept. St., China, vol. XXVII, enclosure to no. 69.
59 IWSM, LXIX, 38b, 9; 39a, 2–39b, 4.
disadvantageous to China. Brown supplied that information and also offered valid reasons for prompt ratification, and the foreign office acted at once.

We have already traced the progress of the mission through Europe to Russia, where Burlingame died after a brief illness, and we must now examine the reaction of the Chinese government to his demise, particularly since Cordier says that its attitude was one of indifference. In a memorial to the Throne, dated May 10, 1870, the ministers of the foreign office report that they received their first information of Burlingame’s death in March from the Russian representative in Peking, who had been notified by telegraph and courier. They wrote at once, even before hearing directly from Chih Kang and Sun Chia-ku, ordering them to send more information, and to speed up the work of the mission, always acting in consultation with Brown and De Champs. They go on to say that a letter has finally been received from Chih Kang and Sun giving the details of Burlingame’s illness and death and saying that they have turned over to Mrs. Burlingame 6000 taels from the funds of the mission to pay for sending the body back to the United States and to take care of funeral expenses. Because Burlingame died in the service of China, the emperor is requested by the foreign office to bestow, posthumously, the brevet first official rank upon him and to grant to his family an additional sum of 10,000 taels from the funds of the mission to show that China makes proper provision for her envoys.

In answer to the above memorial an edict was issued giving effect to the recommendations of the foreign office and upholding the instructions sent to Chih Kang and Sun by ordering them jointly, with the assistance of Brown and De Champs, to carry on the matters initiated before Burlingame’s death. On May 14, Frederick F. Low, the new American minister, was notified by the foreign office of the steps which had been taken regarding the matter of Burlingame’s death in a letter which included a copy of the whole edict with the exception of a few unimportant lines. Cordier’s criticism of the attitude of the Chinese government in this matter seems undeservedly harsh, for as Low writes to Secretary Fish on May 19, the “duties entrusted to Mr. Burlingame

60 Cordier, I, 302; Williams, p. 263.

61 The implication in Cordier (I, 302) that Great Britain tried to have Brown promoted to the position left vacant by Burlingame’s death receives no support from the Chinese documents.


63 IWSM, LXXII, 10a, 10–10b, 8. Chih Kang’s Diary, 138a, 14–18.

64 U. S. Legation Arch., China, no. 234, ff. 189–190.
had been performed to the entire satisfaction of the Emperor and his
advisers, and . . . his services . . . acknowledged in a manner evincing
great respect, gratitude and liberality".65 It is difficult to see what more
could have been done.

The mission left Russia on April 20, 1870, and after a brief stop in
Berlin reached the capital of Belgium on the 26th. On May 15 it went
on to Paris, whence it departed for Italy on the 28th, reaching Florence,
after some stops by the way, nine days later. The party devoted some
two weeks to sight-seeing in Italy and then returned to Paris, arriving
there nearly a month before the news of the Tientsin Massacre. The
mission remained there during the period of the most bitter feeling
against the Chinese after the arrival of the news, and Chih Kang was
able to record some of the manifestations of this bitterness in his diary.66

On August 1 the members of the mission left Paris for Spain, and
returned on the 13th after having spent most of the time in Madrid.
Leaving Paris for the last time on the 27th, the envoys went to Marseilles
where they embarked for China, reaching Shanghai on October 18. A
month later, on November 18, they arrived in Peking, after having been
away nearly three years and having traveled about 42,000 miles.67

The sending of the Burlingame Mission marked a distinct departure
from the traditional attitude of the Chinese government toward other
countries, for it represented the first voluntary effort to deal with
Western powers on terms of equality. According to the judgment of
H. B. Morse and many other foreigners, the mission was a failure be-
cause it was not followed at once by the establishment of Chinese lega-
tions abroad, but the available evidence gives more support to Professor
Williams's belief that "its success was quite equal to the anticipations of
its promotors". The Chinese officials who had charge of foreign relations
evidently felt that, having accomplished their immediate purpose by
sending this mission, further representation abroad could be postponed
until a more definite need should arise.

Peiping, China.

65 Ibid., 185. A portion of this letter is quoted in Williams, pp. 263–264.
66 Chih Kang's Diary, 133a, 3-137a, 4; 137a, 5-139a, 14. News of the massacre,
which took place on June 21, 1870, and in the course of which thirteen French subjects,
including two consular officials, seven other foreigners, and a number of Chinese Chris-
tians were killed by the Tientsin populace, was received in Paris from Kiakhta on July
20. Ibid., 138b, 16.
67 Ibid., 139b, 3-144a, 16.
Chinese Characters.

a. 簽辦夷務始末  b. 同文館  c. 斌椿  d. 恭親王  e. 辦理各國中外交涉事務大臣
f. 章京  g. 大臣之左協理大臣之右協理
h. 志剛  i. 孫家毅  j. 辦理中外交涉事務大臣
k. 德明 張德彝  l. 鳳儀  m. 塔克什訥
n. 桂榮  o. 聯芳  p. 廷俊  q. 有益無損重大
r. 丁寶楨  s. 李鴻章  t. 官文  u. 倭仁
v. 曾國藩  w. 宜曆初使泰西記王錫祺 小方壺齋輿地叢鈔
x. 欽差重任大臣
y. 文祥  z. 僖恂